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This paper analyses a shift in EU governance characterised by the proliferation of soft 
governance frameworks incorporating ‘harder’ elements, labelled ‘harder soft governance’. 
We examine two policy areas – health and energy – where strikingly similar governance 
architectures – the European Semester and the Energy Union Governance Regulation – are now 
core governance tools. We use the Experimentalist Governance framework, supplemented with 
the harder features of ‘harder soft governance’, drawing on a qualitative comparative case study 
approach and an original set of elite interviews, to address two questions: (1) What instruments, 
processes and actors do the Semester and the Governance Regulation involve? and, (2) What 
is driving the governance shift in these areas? We show that, in both cases, ‘harder soft 
governance’ has emerged out of incomplete competences and sovereignty concerns. In health, 
this shift has been driven primarily by the creative entrepreneurship of health actors, whilst in 
energy it results from the need to ensure cooperation while respecting member states’ concerns. 
We conclude, drawing on the more extensive experience of health in the Semester, that the 
introduction of policy coupling, the strategic approach of key actors and the potential for crisis 
politics will shape the future of energy governance.   
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A strengthening of soft governance is being seen across many European Union (EU) policy 
areas (Graziano & Halpern, 2016; Ringel & Knodt, 2018). This has been conceptualised as a 
‘harder soft [mode of] governance’ (HSG) whereby policy instruments with a ‘soft’ basis – 
such as peer review or policy monitoring – are supplemented with a ‘harder’ element – for 
instance, by making the outcomes of peer review public, or by applying sanctions where 
monitoring reveals shortcomings (see Knodt & Schoenefeld, forthcoming).  
HSG is understood here as an evolution of the ‘new’ modes of governance (NMGs) in EU 
policy-making, which emerged in the 1990s to address the legitimacy challenges faced by the 
traditional Community Method,i and to circumvent gaps in EU competence which made 
authority-based governance legally and politically unacceptable (Eberlein & Kerwer, 2004). 
For instance, the open method of coordination (OMC), the most commonly cited NMG, creates 
forums where national governments and EU institutions coordinate to agree guidelines, report 
on national progress, share best practice and monitor performance against benchmarks, but do 
not commit to harmonised approaches or enforced targets (European Council, 2000; Trubek & 
Trubek, 2005).  
Though the OMC has enjoyed some success, its reliance on the willingness of national 
governments to initiate policy change has limited compliance and more recent NMGs have 
begun to include elements of HSG (de la Porte & Heins, 2016). The European Semester is a 
prime example of this dynamic. Mirroring many of the features of the OMC, the Semester is 
an annual cycle of analysis, reporting, recommendations and evaluation, ‘hardened’ by the 
potential for sanctions where member states fail to implement recommendations. After almost 
a decade of operation, the Semester has become the core tool of the EU’s economic governance. 
We argue that its balance of softer and harder elements is now being mirrored elsewhere, 
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including in the new Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action 
(hereafter Governance Regulation).  
This article uses the Semester to explore how soft governance has hardened, the extent to which 
energy governance has developed in a similar way, and what implications this might have for 
energy policy. It addresses two research questions: (1) what instruments, processes and actors 
do the Semester and the Governance Regulation involve? And, (2) what is driving this shift in 
governance? 
The article first outlines the analytical framework, combining Experimentalist Governance 
with the harder elements identified by HSG, and the methodological approach used. We then 
introduce the European Semester and its particular instruments, processes and actors, 
highlighting its ‘harder’ elements of governance and parallels with the Governance Regulation. 
The third section explores what is driving the proliferation of HSG, drawing on the legal and 
political contexts of health and energy policy, as well as the literature on the drivers of NMGs. 
We show that, in both cases, ‘harder soft governance’ has emerged out of incomplete EU 
competences and member states’ sovereignty concerns in core areas. In health, the governance 
shift has been driven by the creative entrepreneurship of health actors, whilst in energy it results 
from the need to ensure cooperation under the Commission’s monitoring role, while respecting 
member states’ concerns about control over sensitive aspects. Drawing on the experience of 
health in the Semester, we conclude that the introduction of policy coupling, the strategic 
approach of key actors and the potential for crisis politics will shape the future of energy 
governance. 
1. Analysing the new modes of governance, from soft to hard(er)?  
 
We understand both the Semester and the Governance Regulation to be examples of NMGs. 
We draw on Sabel and Zeitlin’s (2010) Experimentalist Governance framework, which 
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provides a structure to identify the constitutive features of NMGs, and combine this with the 
harder features identified by HSG (Knodt & Schoenefeld, forthcoming), to assess the 
governance shifts in the Semester and the Governance Regulation.  
1.1. Experimentalist Governance and its limitations 
 
Whilst there is no definitive framework for analysing the NMGs, Sabel and Zeitlin’s (2010) 
Experimentalist Governance framework is useful to identify their key features and logics. It 
provides a clearly defined template to analyse the various instruments and mechanisms 
involved in the Semester and the Governance Regulation. Sabel and Zeitlin (2010a, p. 13) 
characterise Experimentalist Governance as consisting of four key elements, linked in an 
ongoing, iterative cycle. First, broad ‘framework goals’ are agreed jointly at the higher 
governance level, and metrics are adopted so that progress can be measured. Second, 
responsibility for pursuing these goals is given to the ‘lower level units’ and these units are 
given considerable discretion to adopt any measure they see fit to achieve them. Third, the 
condition of this discretion is that lower level units report regularly on their activities, undergo 
peer review of their performance and justify their decisions publicly; this facilitates scrutiny, 
contestation and participation by a wider range of actors (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008). Finally, the 
goals, metrics and procedures of decision-making themselves are periodically revised in 
response to learning in the earlier stages, and the cycle repeats.  
This model is predominantly soft, based on learning and cooperation, and makes little mention 
of hardened governance elements. An exception to this, however, is the concept of ‘penalty 
defaults’ – mechanisms that underpin experimentalist regimes and induce parties to cooperate 
by raising the costs of inaction and making the alternative to the proposed cooperation 
‘sufficiently unpalatable’ (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2010a, p. 14). Giving the examples of market 
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exclusion, or threat of regulatory intervention or trade sanctions, Keohane and Victor’s 
description is instructive: 
‘A penalty default…is a form of enforcement that does not prescribe solutions – 
which may be impossible to agree on because states likely to be targeted will block 
them – but that forces the actors to cooperate unless they are willing to risk losing 
control of their joint fate’ (2015, p. 207). 
Sabel and Zeitlin draw a sharp distinction between penalty defaults and the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ view of NMGs (e.g. Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008). For them, the latter refers to the 
ability of authorities to impose an unwanted outcome on cooperating parties in case of lack of 
agreement, inducing them into reaching a compromise. In contrast, penalty defaults involve an 
alternative to cooperation that is ‘so manifestly unworkable to the parties as to count as a 
draconian penalty’ (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008, p. 308); it therefore does not require the potential 
intervention of a superior authority to induce cooperation. This idea is tied to the condition of 
uncertainty which underlies Experimentalist Governance and does not presuppose hierarchical 
mechanisms. Beyond this concept, the framework provides little to identify mechanisms that 
are aimed at ensuring not only cooperation, but compliance. To compensate for this, we draw 
on the features of HSG as outlined by Knodt & Schoenefeld (forthcoming). 
1.2. Harder soft governance as a supplementary perspective  
Knodt and Schoenefeld (forthcoming) observe a recent trend in the inclusion of harder elements 
in soft governance arrangements by the Commission, as well as in other policy arenas. In 
conceptualising HSG they identify a series of mechanisms, introduced into governance 
frameworks, through which hardening can take place. These include: ‘Hard’ targets or 
implementation mechanisms which reshape voluntarism; naming, blaming and shaming via 
publication of rankings, reports and other information; institutionalising political entrepreneurs 
and strengthening their role; requiring justification of (in)action by member states; coupling 
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policy fields to create linked (dis)incentives; introducing sanctions or penalties for non-
compliance; and including a mandate for Commission tertiary legislation. They acknowledge 
that this is not an exhaustive list and encourage empirical studies to identify additional 
mechanisms; this article responds to that call by exploring the existence of HSG within the 
Semester and the Governance Regulation. The elements above are summarised in table 1 (page 
20 below), along with additional mechanisms of hardening observed in the cases of health and 
energy policy.  
 
1.3. Drivers of the shift in governance 
 
In seeking to address our second question, in which we analyse the interests and political 
dynamics that are driving the development of HSG, we encounter a further limitation of both 
the Experimentalist Governance and the HSG models, in that neither is intended to provide an 
explanatory framework. As such, we turn here to the literature on NMGs and its understanding 
of why non-traditional governance architectures have become a significant feature of EU 
governance.  
There are three primary lines of argument which explain the motivations for adopting NMGs. 
The first holds that NMGs enable the EU, and particularly the Commission, to extend its 
authority and influence into areas from which it is excluded. Dehousse (2016) argues that, 
though there has been a decline in hard legislative output which coincides with the proliferation 
of NMGs, the EU’s governing capacity has not been weakened, but rather has been extended 
into new fields. Similarly, Caporaso and Wittenbrinck (2006) frame the introduction of the 
NMGs as a response to the question of ‘where to next?’ for European integration, after the 
establishment of the Single European Act and the Economic and Monetary Union, indicating 
their role in policy expansion.  
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A second, related, argument focuses on the ability of NMGs to address the issue of non-
compliance with hard law. Decision-makers might adopt soft law in the expectation that it will 
act as a precursor to hard law, or so as to use the threat of this potential evolution to push parties 
into compliance (Maher, 2004). More constructively, some see NMGs as a mechanism to 
address non-compliance via processes of learning and creation of common norms (Radaelli, 
2008; Zeitlin, 2005). Though Saurugger and Terpan (2016) find that compliance with soft law 
is no more common than with hard, the potential to overcome paralysis resulting from vetoes 
remains a core motivation for using NMGs (Caporaso & Wittenbrinck, 2006).   
Finally, concerns about sovereignty are understood as key motivators for the introduction of 
NMGs. A core advantage of soft law over hard law, as identified by Abbott and Snidal, is that 
it is easier to agree than hard law, and this is ‘especially true when the actors are states that are 
jealous of their autonomy and when the issues at hand challenge state sovereignty’ (2000, p. 
423). In this view, the use of NMGs is driven by a need to convince member states that 
‘convergence is possible without major sovereignty losses’ (Saurugger & Terpan, 2016, p. 58) 
in pursuit of a common goal. Taking these understandings of what is driving the proliferation 
of NMGs as a starting point, we explore the motivations behind the governance shifts in the 
case studies.  
1.4. Methodology 
 
When examining the causal processes behind the proliferation of HSG in particular sectors, the 
historical political and legal contexts of these sectors is important. Since the Semester is a 
horizontal governance architecture (Borras & Radaelli, 2011), its recommendations target a 
range of policy areas; as such, we use its impact upon health policy as a case study to draw 
insights about the potential impact of the Governance Regulation on energy policy. The two 
sectors share considerable similarities. In both, competences are shared and, whilst the EU has 
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accumulated significant influence, national governments remain wary of ceding competence. 
Integration has relied on the application and extension of internal market rules, as well as 
interdependency with related policy areas, such as competition, trade, security and climate, 
reflecting the ‘nexus quality’ of both sectors (Ringel & Knodt, 2018, p. 210; Müller et al., 
2015). In both, dedicated legal bases were only established more recently, at Maastricht (for 
health) and Lisbon (for energy), and only enable use of the ordinary legislative procedure in 
specific issue areas, which include renewable energy, the internal energy market and energy 
efficiency, and public health. In areas of greater sensitivity – such as the energy mix, and the 
organisation and financing of health systems – the EU is restricted to soft governance. 
The article’s empirical basis is a primary documentary analysis and data from 21 semi-
structured anonymous elite interviews. The latter were conducted between 2015 and 2018 with 
key actors, including those representing EU institutions and member states (see appendix 1). 
Documentary analysis included the core documents of the European Semester and of the 
Governance Regulation, and mapped the instruments, processes, mechanisms and actors 
involved in each governance architecture.  
 
2. The experimental governance of the European Semester and Energy Union  
 
This section considers the first research question – how are health and energy governed, and 
what instruments, processes and actors are involved? The extent to which these policy areas 
are governed by an experimentalist structure is discussed, and we highlight where elements of 
HSG are additionally present. In doing so, we illustrate the similarity between the modes of 
governance used in the Semester and the Governance Regulation.  
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2.1. The European Semester: overview 
The European Semester is the EU’s six-month fiscal planning process, synchronising the 
surveillance, reporting and enforcement elements of both the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
– which sets targets for national debt and deficits – and the Europe 2020 Strategy – which 
promotes jobs and growth in the Union. It responds to perceived weaknesses in the Economic 
and Monetary Union and the SGP by establishing an ongoing process of surveillance of 
national budgets. National governments report on progress towards priorities adopted at EU 
level, including via the Europe 2020 Strategy, and the European Commission monitors 
performance against a set of agreed indicators. Where a country is found lacking, its 
government must explain its decisions, take remedial action and, if still considered to pose a 
threat to EU-wide economic stability, face sanctions.  
The cycle starts with the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), in which the Commission assesses 
priorities for the EU as a whole. National governments communicate their plans in response to 
this, and the EU makes recommendations to each member state. Though formally non-binding, 
these Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) can trigger coercive responses for those 
countries subject to the Excessive Deficit Procedure or the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure. In each of these instances, sanctions are decided by reverse-qualified majority 
voting, meaning that they are imposed automatically save for a blocking vote by a qualified 
majority. As such, whilst it draws heavily on the instruments and processes of the OMC, what 
distinguishes the Semester is the potential for its ‘soft’ recommendations to become ‘hard’ 
requirements where member states fail to abide by the rules (Bauer & Becker, 2014). 
The Semester was not designed as a tool of health governance but, since health makes up a 
significant proportion of expenditure in all member states, health systems became a target of 
efforts to induce fiscal sustainability. Health at the EU level has historically been governed by 
policy frameworks and competences outside of health, such as the internal market (Greer, 
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2014), but the Semester constitutes a marked change in two ways. Firstly, it extends EU action 
into the realm of healthcare financing and organisation – arguably the most sensitive area of 
national health policy. Secondly, it does so using a combination of soft and hard instruments, 
making member states’ discretion to ignore recommendations dependent upon their fiscal 
situation (Stamati & Baeten, 2015; interview 19). Few of these instruments are new to health 
– not least of all because most are duplicated from the healthcare OMC – but the extent to 
which they are binding, their linkage with other policies and the scale of the policy surveillance 
which accompanies them is novel, as explored below.  
2.2. The Governance Regulation: overview  
Energy and climate objectives were included in early cycles of the Semester and low-key 
dialogue between member states and the Commission, within the Semester’s framework, was 
taking place. However, Commission officials report that climate and energy policy remained 
at the periphery in a process driven by the response to the economic crisis and the perceived 
need to reinforce macroeconomic coordination; energy did not feature prominently in the CSRs 
(interviews 2, 4). Despite this limited influence of the Semester, the Council of the EU 
requested that when a dedicated framework for the governance of the Energy Union was to be 
created, it be modelled on the Semester (interviews 1, 2, 3).  
The Energy Union, which includes the Clean Energy Package for 2030, constitutes a shift in 
energy governance. Unlike the 2020 framework – the so-called Climate and Energy Package 
adopted in 2009 – the Clean Energy Package no longer includes nationally binding targets, 
except for climate change. To ensure monitoring of progress and compliance, the Package 
includes an innovative piece of legislation, the Governance Regulation. This stipulates that 
member states set their own objectives and pathways towards meeting EU targets through 
National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs). The overarching purpose of the Governance 
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Regulation is different from the crisis-driven Semester; it seeks to set a positive, proactive 
agenda for shaping further integration. Yet it contains many elements similar to the Semester 
– for instance, the Commission’s national recommendations – and provisions have been made 
for complementarity between the two governance architectures (interview 4).  
Addressing our first research question we examine the specific instruments, processes and 
actors that the Semester and the Governance Regulation involve. We show that the primary 
components of the experimentalist ‘cycle’ can be identified in both the Semester and the 
Governance Regulation, but that harder elements, not foreseen by the Experimentalist 
Governance framework, are also present.  
2.3. Framework goals 
Within the Semester, framework goals are set by the AGS. There were originally three 
overarching priorities for the EU: ‘rigorous fiscal consolidation, ‘labour market reforms’ and 
‘growth-enhancing measures’ (European Commission, 2010). For health, the goals in the AGS 
have varied in their specificity, with early Surveys calling for broad reforms to promote ‘cost-
effectiveness and sustainability’ (European Commission, 2011, p. 5) and later iterations 
providing more detailed encouragement to ‘provide quality health care through efficient 
structures, including eHealth’ (European Commission, 2014, p. 13), for instance. The CSRs 
embody the agreed routes by which member states will pursue the goals, in light of their 
particular national contexts, and thus serve as metrics by which progress can be measured. For 
example, CSRs might advise member states to ‘implement…administrative reform with a view 
to better cost-effectiveness of…healthcare services’ (Council of the EU, 2016, p. 82).  
Whilst the Semester implements the hard targets of the SGP – which limit government deficits 
to 3% of GDP and debts to 60% of GDP, and are sanctionable save for a blocking vote in the 
Council – it does not set its own hard framework goals. The exception here is the Excessive 
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Deficit Procedure (EDP) and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, in which member 
states that have deviated from the SGP ceilings are issued with recommendations drawn from 
the CSRs, and face sanctions if they do not comply. In one instance, this has presented a 
remarkable situation for health policy. Whilst under the EDP, France had a CSR urging it to 
fundamentally restructure its health workforce policy by abolishing its long-standing annual 
limit on the recruitment of medical students (European Council, 2015). France exited the EDP 
relatively quickly, and thus escaped having to comply with the requirement, but the case 
illustrated the potential for unprecedented EU influence over a national health system, borne 
from the hardening of a framework goal (Greer & Jarman, 2018).  
In energy, the framework goals of the Energy Union are defined at the central level, in a more 
precise fashion than in health. These include the 2030 targets for GHG emission reductions (-
40%), renewable energy supply (32%) and energy efficiency (32.5%) as well as other headline 
objectives such as transnational interconnections for electricity (15%). These goals were 
enshrined in legislation as part of the 2018 ‘Clean Energy Package’. However, they are not all 
of the same legal nature. While the emission reduction objective is binding at both EU and 
national levels, and directly enforceable, the renewable energy target is binding at the EU level 
only and energy efficiency targets are non-binding at both levels.ii Associated legislation, such 
as the revised Renewable Energy Directive, define precisely how to measure progress and what 
counts towards achieving the targets. 
In terms of framework goals, we therefore observe contradictory dynamics across the two 
sectors. In health, a shift towards HSG has come primarily via specificity. The health-related 
framework goals set in the AGS have become more precise, limiting the flexibility available to 
governments and challenging their ability to claim compliance with vaguely-worded 
recommendations (Baeten & Vanhercke, 2017). As noted in energy, the Clean Energy Package 
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for 2040 no longer includes nationally binding renewable energy targets as was the case in the 
2020 energy and climate framework, with them binding only at EU level. The dynamic here is 
thus one of partial softening of framework goals. 
2.4. Lower level unit responsibility and reporting 
The lower-level units responsible for achieving the framework goals are, across both the 
Semester and the Governance Regulation, the member states. In the Semester, governments are 
required to submit Stability or Convergence Programmes, which serve as public reporting on 
adjustment towards the SGP rules, National Reform Programmes (NRPs), detailing progress 
towards the goals of Europe 2020 and, for euro area states, Draft Budgetary Programmes, 
through which the EU exercises ex ante control over fiscal policies. In addition to being formal 
requirements of the Semester process, these reporting mechanisms serve as platforms for 
member states to justify their actions. In the NRPs, for instance, governments have to specify 
precisely which policies they will introduce to boost jobs and growth, and correct imbalances 
(Eurofound, 2018). For example, Belgium’s 2014 NRP details the specific assessment 
instrument introduced to assess patients and various other policies which will contribute to 
achieving the CSR on increasing the cost-effectiveness of long-term care (Belgian government, 
2014, pp.8-9). Moreover, the NRPs are themselves based on Commission guidance issued in 
the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and inform the drafting of the CSRs (Eurofound, 2018), 
reinforcing the cycle of policy influence and hardening these soft reporting mechanisms.  
Similar reporting structures are seen within the Governance Regulation, building on pre-
existing requirements fragmented across different pieces of legislation. For instance, the 2009 
Renewable Energy Directive included a process of regular reporting of progress towards 
achieving EU and national 2020 targets (Howes, 2010). The 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive 
included a similar mechanism (EP and the Council, 2012). The Governance Regulation 
reinforces reporting requirements through their harmonisation into a single framework for all 
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Energy Union objectives – ‘to streamline and bring together separate planning and reporting 
strands’ (European Parliament and Council, 2018a, p. 8).  
The Governance Regulation also introduces a novel ‘pledge and review’ process. This is 
partially modelled on the Semester but also, and perhaps more importantly, on the 2015 Paris 
[Climate] Agreement, which is decentralised and non-binding at the national level (Oberthür, 
2019). Member states must submit integrated 10-year NECPs to the Commission, representing 
their contribution towards meeting EU framework goals. Although the Commission is mainly 
tasked with monitoring and compliance, the drafts include information defined in broad terms 
in the Governance Regulation and further specified through templates set up by the 
Commission and a continuous informal dialogue.iii The Commission also takes stock of 
national pledges and identifies any ambition – and later implementation – gaps. The 
Commission evaluates NECPs and can issue recommendations to member states, although 
these are non-binding, since a large number of member states were adamant about retaining 
their ability to define their own national trajectories and instruments (interviews 3, 6, 8, 13).  
2.5. Periodic revision 
The framework goals, metrics and processes of the Semester have changed considerably since 
it was launched in 2010. Through this revision, a process of ‘socialisation’ is well-recorded in 
the literature (Zeitlin & Vanhercke, 2018) and traces the increasing emphasis on social 
objectives, the expansion of social policy monitoring and surveillance, and the growing role of 
social policy actors (European Commission, 2018b). For instance, in health, the framework 
goals have broadened from cost-containment to universal access to healthcare (as featured in 
the latest AGS) and the metrics and indicators used to monitor progress have expanded to 
include data on unmet medical need and out-of-pocket payment for health services (interview 
18).  
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The Governance Regulation also provides for periodic revision. The Commission will issue an 
annual State of the Energy Union report that tracks progress towards EU objectives. By 2023, 
the Commission will review progress towards achieving the 2030 goals and its commitments 
as part of the Paris agreement, ‘including provision for a review and potential increase in the 
Union-level target’ (EP and the Council, 2018a, p. 5). This upwards revision clause would be 
triggered, for example, if the EU suffers from an ambition or implementation gap related to the 
2030 targets. The changes to targets between 2014 and 2018 – where the target for renewable 
energy was upgraded from 27% to 32%, and for energy efficiency from 27% to 32.5% – 
demonstrates the potential for upwards revision.  
3. The harder-edge of Experimentalist Governance 
The Semester and Governance Regulation are comprised of a similar set of soft, experimental 
instruments and mechanisms; however, we find a number of additional HSG elements are also 
present.  
3.1. Penalty defaults & the shadow of hierarchy 
Both the Semester and the Governance Regulation exhibit harder features in the form of 
‘penalty defaults’, perhaps even more centrally than the Experimentalist Governance 
framework would suggest. In health, Greer and Vanhercke identify clearly the default penalty 
which encouraged health actors to engage in the OMC on health: ‘the penalty for lack of action 
is progressive submission to internal market law as extended in an unpredictable, case-by-case 
manner’ (2010, p. 222). This example closely reflects the kind of penalty envisaged by Zeitlin 
(2008) – who points to the unpredictability of the EU competition law regime as a particularly 
strong source of penalty defaults – but is less relevant in the case of the Semester, where the 
EU has little competence to govern the areas of health targeted. Instead, the penalty here is that 
actors with less knowledge of (and potentially regard for) health, led by the Commission’s 
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Economic and Financial Affairs directorate, will be responsible for drafting recommendations 
which impact upon health (Stamati & Baeten, 2015, p. 189; interview 20). Health ministers 
were initially induced to engage by the realisation that, if they did not, their counterparts in 
treasury and finance ministries would continue to make policy which affected health without 
due concern (interviews 15, 16; Fierlbeck, 2014, p. 93). They were struck by the reality that 
‘even if they are not at the [Semester] table, they will remain on the menu’ (interview 17).  
The Governance Regulation also rests on a hard edge. First, some energy objectives are binding 
and enshrined in legislation, which makes them, to an extent, directly enforceable by the Court 
(e.g. Greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in non-ETS sector, eco-design provisions). 
Second, although the renewable energy target is only binding at the EU level, included in the 
Annex is an indicative formula for the calculation of national objectives to achieve the EU goal 
(EP and the Council, 2018b: Annex II). These come close to national targets and provide a 
clear benchmark to assess individual national failures and ‘laggards’ (interviews 5, 9). Indeed, 
in its recommendations of June 2019 on the very first NECPs, the Commission has not shied 
from using the formula to recommend more ambition on renewable energy from 12 states 
(Euractiv, 2019). Third, the Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts to bring the 
Governance Regulation in line with the evolution of the EU’s long term energy and climate 
strategy as part of the Paris agreement (Article 43). Fourth, if there is an ambition or 
implementation gap, the Commission ‘shall propose measures and exercise its powers at Union 
level in order to ensure the collective achievement of…objectives and targets’ (Article 31). 
These mechanisms serve as clear penalty defaults to encourage cooperation within the 
Governance Regulation framework. Given the existence of substantive EU competences on 
climate and energy, and the fact that the Governance Regulation is supported by associated 
legislation, it can be argued that it relies to a greater extent on the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ than 
health. 
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3.2. Hardening soft governance 
Three other elements of HSG, not directly included within the Experimentalist Governance 
framework, are the creation of a high threshold for change, the involvement of and 
institutionalisation of additional actors, and policy coupling.  
High thresholds for change have been installed at two key points of the Semester. Firstly, 
overturning of fines for non-compliance with the deficit procedure requires a reverse qualified 
majority – i.e. a qualified majority of states to challenge, rather than to approve – making 
sanctions ‘automatic’ by default. Secondly, amendment of the CSRs proposed by the 
Commission requires a ‘reinforced’ qualified majority in the Council.iv This is combined with 
a ‘comply or explain’ rule compelling the Council to publicly justify the change sought (Zeitlin 
& Vanhercke, 2018, p. 161), a requirement that amendments may not ‘reduce a member state’s 
effort’, and a short timeframe for their agreement; ‘as a result, no substantial amendments to 
health CSRs have yet been approved by the Council’ (Baeten & Vanhercke, 2017, pp. 489-90).  
In the Governance Regulation the high threshold for change is of a different nature. The 
recommendations of the Commission are non-binding – member states only have to take ‘due 
account’ and respond. However, several targets and obligations are binding as they are 
enshrined in associated legislation. Change would require the Commission to issue new 
legislative proposal(s) to be adopted by the legislature. 
A second element of HSG is the institutionalisation of political entrepreneurs – namely, civil 
society actors. A full exposition of the dynamics which have unfolded in the Semester is 
beyond the scope of this article (on its ‘socialisation’ see Zeitlin & Vanhercke, 2018), but as 
the role of civil society has increased over successive cycles, so the specificity of relevant 
recommendations and public accountability of the process has increased. For instance, the 
Semester process has evolved to provide for greater involvement of health ministries, civil 
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society actors and the Commission’s health directorate, whilst the latter has significantly 
increased its expertise in health system performance assessment and aggregation of country-
specific health information to ensure its involvement (Brooks, 2015; interviews 14, 18, 19). 
In energy, the involvement of civil society is expected to be a key part of the process. The plans 
and recommendations have been made public, and it is hoped that this increased transparency 
will facilitate peer pressure from other governments at the EU level, and public criticism at the 
national level from stakeholders and civil society actors (e.g. environmental NGOs), forcing 
them to justify themselves to one another, the EU institutions and the public, and to change 
course if needed (interviews 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11). The publication of the Commission’s first 
summary of Recommendations in June 2019 (Commission, 2019) was followed by extensive 
media coverage and criticism from NGOs (The Guardian, 2019).  
Finally, instances of policy coupling can be seen in both governance architectures. In the 
Semester, the rules of the 2014-2020 European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) enable 
the Commission to request a government to direct part of any funding that it receives in pursuit 
of its CSRs, making the ESIF a ‘potential lever for implementation of the CSRs’ (Baeten & 
Vanhercke, 2017, p. 491). The Governance Regulation, meanwhile, connects in novel and 
formal ways processes of reporting and progress monitoring for energy and climate through 
the integrated NECPs. Interviewees referred to a Governance Regulation objective of 
developing the coherence and coordination between climate and energy policy; ‘breaking the 
silos’ (interviews 7, 8). Arguably, coupling energy to climate policy, a more established policy 
area which benefits from strong support and momentum, can be interpreted as a way to 
consolidate EU energy policy.  
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Table 1: Harder elements in the governance of health and energy 
Mechanism Description Health – Semester Energy – The Governance Regulation 
‘Hard’ 
targets/implementation 




The Semester implements the binding SGP 
debt and deficit targets. 
GHG (EU & national) and renewable (EU only) targets 
binding. Energy efficiency headline target non-binding; 
specific targets binding.  
Naming, blaming and 
shaming 
Through increased publicity; public 
information; country rankings, 
public databases. 
Country-specific analysis in the Country 
Reports; ‘Social scoreboard’.  
NECP plans made public to increase transparency and peer 
pressure on laggards. 
Institutionalising 
political entrepreneurs 
Strengthening the role of potential 
political entrepreneurs by giving 
them political role. 
The institutionalised role of social actors 
and civil society.  
Publicising drafts, plans and gaps to foster civil society 
participation in/and accountability. 
Justification Ensure States justify (non)reaction 
towards policy recommendation of 
higher/European level. 
Amendments to CSRs require public 
justification; National Reforms 
Programmes serve as justification on 
progress. 
Governments must publicly respond to Commission 
recommendations re ambition gap(s). 
Policy field coupling Linking soft governance policy 
fields to provide financial 
incentives / sanctions. 
Linked with European Structural and 
Investment Funds. 
Harnesses energy objectives to climate governance (e.g. 
emissions reporting). 
Sanctions Introduction of sanctions or 
financial penalties in case of non-
compliance etc. 
Excessive Deficit Procedure and 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure both 
entail sanctions.  
Only climate targets enforced by Court. States required to 
follow the process (timely submission of plans, complete 
submission). 
Tertiary legislation The Commission can issue 
implementing/ delegated acts to 
exert pressure. 
N/A.  Commission can issue delegated acts to bring EU 
framework in line with the Paris Agreement, and propose 
secondary legislation if ambition/implementation gap. 
Specificity / tangibility 
of recommendations 
Rather than vague objectives, 
specific targets and timelines.  
CSRs and Country Reports identify 
tangible policy targets.  
Commission templates for NCEPs. Renewables formula to 
provide guidance on objectives and benchmarks. 
High threshold for 
amendment / change / 
input 
Changing instrument or 
recommendation requires consensus 
or is difficult to achieve.  
Amendment to CSRs and opposition to 
sanctions requires reinforced and reversed 
qualified majority respectively. 
Change to EU/national objectives requires legislative 
change under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, using 
Qualified Majority Voting (Commission proposal, 
agreement of the Council and the European Parliament) .  
Enhanced (or variable 
degrees of) 
surveillance 
Where certain conditions are met, 
more intensive policy surveillance 
initiated.  
Member states subject to EDP are subject 
to enhanced monitoring.  
Standardised, comprehensive process of reporting. 
Publication of detailed national plans, based on templates, 
enable the Commission to track progress. 
Source: Adapted by authors from Knodt & Schoenefeld (forthcoming). 
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4. Exploring drivers of the shift in governance 
 
Addressing our second research question, we explore the drivers of the change in governance 
of health and energy policies, and consider the possible lessons learned from the European 
Semester for the Governance Regulation. 
The need to circumvent a lack of formal competences and/or sovereignty concerns in sensitive 
areas has been a key driver of the shift in governance. Both health and energy might be 
considered core state powers – i.e. essential aspect of its raison d’être and legitimacy. It might 
then be expected that member states would fight further EU encroachment fiercely. For health 
in the Semester, the recourse to hard law – or laying the groundwork for future legislation – is 
not a potential source of pressure, since health system organisation and financing are outside 
of the EU’s competence. Moreover, health actors and the Commission more broadly did not 
create the Semester with the intention of encroaching this competence – whilst they are now 
seeking to utilise it in pursuit of health objectives, this a reactive strategy.  
As such, whilst the hardening of fiscal sustainability rules within the Semester as a whole might 
be driven by a need to circumvent non-compliance with the SGP, utilisation of a HSG 
framework in health is a result of creative opportunism on the part of health actors and, in 
particular, the Commission’s health directorate. Officials view the Semester as an opportunity 
to consolidate and extend the EU’s health system agenda (interviews 24, 25; Baeten & 
Thomson, 2012: 10; Brooks, 2015) and states now receive CSRs on areas core to health system 
organisation, indicating extended European integration (Azzopardi-Muscat et al., 2015, p. 380; 
Greer, 2014). Civil society actors have been key to this pro-active strategy, contesting the 
ownership of finance actors over the process (Sabato et al., 2017, p. 18; Stamati & Baeten, 
2015, p. 189). 
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In energy, concerns about security and sovereignty have long limited national governments’ 
willingness to delegate further power to the EU level in energy policy (Padgett, 1992), and the 
exploitation of national energy resources, the determination of the energy mix and taxation 
remained firmly national prerogatives. It is largely on sovereignty grounds that the European 
Council did not endorse binding national renewable energy targets in 2014 (The Guardian, 
2014).  
Supranational activism is less clear cut, as the Governance Regulation mainly builds on already 
existing EU competences and Commission’s prerogatives. Where powers for the Commission 
can be argued to have been enhanced, including the surveillance and publicity of member state 
plans, this is linked to, and compensation for, member states guarding their sovereignty by 
insisting on the removal of national targets for renewables (interviews 8, 10); this compensation 
was also strongly driven by member states such as Germany and France (interviews 7, 10) so 
is less clearly a result of the Commission seeking to extend its authority but rather to safeguard 
it (interview 15). In the absence of hard national targets enforceable by the Court, the 
Commission, European Parliament and some member states were concerned about the ability 
of the EU to reach its collective target and about the risk of free-riding by less ambitious 
countries (interviews 10, 13). The Governance Regulation was therefore partially designed as 
a second-best solution to accommodate national sovereignty concerns. It provides flexibility 
while inserting national plans into a collective monitoring process under the Commission’s 
leadership to facilitate convergence towards common objectives. The Governance Regulation 
can be regarded as a partial softening of an already existing legal framework – for renewable 
energy – although not in an unambiguous way, given that the monitoring role of the 




The Semester and the Governance Regulation exhibit many features of Experimentalist 
Governance, structured primarily around a cycle of target setting, reporting, surveillance and 
coordination. However, where they diverge from the Experimentalist Governance model is in 
their inclusion of elements of HSG. In both cases, simple soft instruments, such as reporting, 
are hardened by mechanisms of publication, public justification and specificity. The Semester 
is ‘...arguably, the “hardest” form of soft law’ (Garben, 2018, p. 222), combining instruments 
well-known from the OMC with ‘hard edges’ like the deficit and imbalance procedures 
(Dawson, 2018, p. 199). The Governance Regulation is in part built on hard legislation – 
climate legislation, renewable energy directive and efficiency legislation – or in the shadow of 
new legislation, in case framework goals are not met.  
In both cases, we find that the shift towards HSG is driven by a common dynamic; the need to 
alleviate member states’ sovereignty concerns and weak or incomplete competences. Where 
heath and energy differ is in the nature of the countervailing dynamic. In health, HSG has 
emerged from the creative entrepreneurship of health actors. In energy, HSG results more from 
the need to ensure compliance in the absence of hard national targets – for renewable energy 
and energy efficiency at least – while respecting sovereignty concerns.  
From our review of the experience of health within the Semester and similarities with the 
Governance Regulation, we draw particular attention to three implications for energy policy. 
First, policy coupling is an important and influential hardening mechanism. Though not 
unprecedented, the Semester has raised the profile of linkages between EU funds and broader 
policy objectives. Particularly where horizontal issues such as climate change are concerned – 
in which EU competences and legitimacy are more firmly established – this presents a potential 
future avenue for further hardening of the Governance Regulation. It is not unforeseeable that 
the climate emergency and pressure arising from international climate negotiations may lead 
to an expansion of the reach of the Governance regulation. Second, the operation and evolution 
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of the Governance Regulation will depend in large part upon the engagement and approach of 
relevant actors. The Governance Regulation provides an avenue for creative opportunism and 
the health, and broader social, policy experience through the European Semester illustrates the 
impact that this can have upon the direction and operation of the governance architecture, by 
altering objectives and accountability. Finally, situations of crisis have the potential to expand 
the reach of soft governance frameworks, introduce elements of HSG into them and 
institutionalise new fields of EU influence. Following the creation of a new ‘EU health systems 
agenda’, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which concerns about security – traditional 
and/or environmental – might see a similar extension of EU involvement in areas of energy 
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Appendix 1: List of interviewees 
 
1. Think tank representative, 13.04.18 
2. DG Energy, 02.07.18 
3. European Parliament, 05.07.18 
4. European Commission, 02.07.18 
5. Senior EU official, 10.04.18 
6. Polish official, 09.04.18 
7. DG Energy, 13.04.18 
8. Swedish official, 29.06.18 
9. Member state official, 02.07.18 
10. Journalist, 04.07.18 
11. Member state official, 04.07.18 
12. Member state official, 05.07.18 
13. Journalist, 06.07.18 
14. Council Official, 22.06.17 
15. Member state official, 22.06.17 
16. Member state official, 23.06.17 
17. Health NGO, 23.06.17 
18. Social Protection Committee, 06.07.17 
19. DG ECFIN, 07.07.17 
20. European Parliament official, 07.07.17 
21. DG Sante, 08.07.15 
 
Endnotes 
i The dominant model of governance since the inception of the Communities in 1957 (Eberlein & Kerwer, 2004). 
The Community Method empowers the European Commission as the sole legislative initiator, the Council of the 
EU (and then the European Parliament) as decision-maker(s), and the Court of Justice for adjudication and 
enforcement.   
ii Although some sub-targets included in the Energy Efficiency Directive and Ecodesign legislation are harder. 
iii ‘A structured, transparent, iterative process between the Commission and Member States’ (Article 1). 
iv 72% of member states, accounting for 65% of the EU population.  
 
